The privacy of wireless communications is becoming an important issue due to the open nature of wireless medium. Much research work has been proposed to address the anonymity of communicating parties, the location privacy of the message source and destination, and the privacy of the network routing paths. However, with the advent of new radio identification and localization techniques, more advanced privacy attacks are possible. We describe a new privacy attack in which the adversary tries to infer the itineraries of the nodes in the network. To protect itinerary privacy, we design an algorithm, called the ∆-mobility camouflaging algorithm, which can be applied upon any mobility model by changing the original motion segments into ∆-shaped camouflaging paths. Our analysis results show that the ∆-mobility camouflaging algorithm is cost-effective, which in most cases decreases the itinerary exposure probability more than 80% at a cost of less than 3% extra travel distance.
Introduction
In a mobile ad-hoc network(MANET), to send a message to another node, the message is forwarded hop-by-hop through wireless links from the message source to the destination. Due to the open nature of the wireless medium, adversaries in the network are able to eavesdrop on wireless communications to obtain the information of interest. For example, in the nonanonymous routing scheme DSR [5] , the IP addresses of the message source and destination are explicitly contained in the message. Hence, for a message detected, the adversary is able to determine the identities of the message source and destination. With the knowledge of message source/destination, the adversary may launch 978-1-4244-2100-8/08/$25.00 c 2008 IEEE an attack targeted to the specific nodes. Possible attacks include discarding a message, altering message content and flooding the message [13] .
Therefore, privacy issues are becoming increasingly important for MANET wireless communications. Many privacy preserving schemes ( [7, 12, 6, 1, 10] ) have been proposed to address correspondent privacy, route privacy and location privacy. The objective of correspondent privacy is to prevent adversaries from discovering who are the message source and destination (e.g [6] ), whereas the objective of route privacy is to prevent adversaries from tracing the network routes of the messages (e.g [7] ). The objective of location privacy may include preventing the adversary from determining the location of the message source and destination or preventing the adversaries from tracing nodes in the network. Two approaches are widely used in this work. One approach uses cryptography to generate pseudonyms to hide the real identities of correspondents or the identities of the nodes on the routes (e.g [7, 12] ). One issue of this approach is that decrypting and encrypting cryptographical pseudonyms may cause large computational overhead [12] . The other approach is to mix the real correspondents among a set of the nodes to make it difficult for the adversary to pinpoint a specific node (e.g [6, 1, 10] ).
With the advent of new wireless localization techniques (e.g [11] ) and radio identification techniques (e.g [2] ), adversaries are able to launch more advanced privacy attacks. The localization technique in [11] is able to localize indoor radio transmitters with 2-meter accuracy based on the radio signals received. And the radio identification technique proposed in [2] by D.B.Faria et al. can robustly identify a radio transmitter by its signalprint (a set of signal strength values collected).
These localization techniques and radio identification techniques enable new privacy attacks. In this article, we describe a new privacy attack, which aims at determining the mobile hosts' itineraries based on the above localization technique and radio identification technique. Nodes in the wireless network are unlikely to move totally randomly but follow a certain schedule [8] . We define itinerary privacy as a property that it is difficult for attackers to determine the itinerary of a node (i.e. when and where it will appear). The itinerary privacy differs from location privacy in that its emphasis is on discovering nodes' repeatedlyoccurring mobility patterns, which most likely reveal a node's routine activities and the paths taken by the node when conducting the activities. We call the path from one activity to another activity as an itinerary segment. We believe itinerary privacy is important because we want to prevent unauthorized tracking of wireless-communicating mobile hosts (e.g. patrol cars, cash-in-transit vehicles, etc). Once the itinerary information of a mobile host is mastered by the adversaries, adversaries may launch many attacks more intelligently and precisely with greater damages.
In our adversarial model, when a radio transmission is detected by the adversary, the adversary stores the transmission print of the radio transmission in its database, which includes the signalprint, location, and the time of the radio transmission. The adversary infers a node's itinerary by associating the transmission prints with the node.
Itinerary privacy is important for protecting correspondent privacy and route privacy. This is because after the itineraries of the nodes are exposed, the adversary can correlate a message detected with the message sender. For example, if the adversary detects a message M is transmitted at location p at time t and the adversary knows that a node x was at p at t based on its knowledge of x's itinerary, then the adversary can infer that x is the sender of M even if M does not expose any identity information of the sender. Therefore, the motivation for this paper is to design a scheme for protecting itinerary privacy. We design an algorithm, called the ∆-mobility camouflaging algorithm, that protects itinerary privacy by camouflaging the nodes' mobility. The ∆-mobility camouflaging algorithm can be applied upon any mobility model by changing the original motion segments into ∆-shaped camouflaging paths. The ∆-mobility camouflaging algorithm is effective because it significantly increases the number of possible motion traces. Also the motion traces of the nodes are "mixed" and become less distinctive. Furthermore, it reduces the probability of generating matchable transmission prints since nodes are unlikely to move in the same path, thereby making it difficult for the adversary to confirm or eliminate a hypothetical motion trace. Our mathematical analysis shows that ∆-mobility camouflaging algorithm is cost-effective, which decreases by more than 80% the itinerary exposure probability at a cost of less than 3% extra travel distance in the cases we studied.
This rest of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces itinerary privacy attack and adversarial model. Section 3 presents the ∆-mobility camouflaging algorithm and analyzes its effectiveness on reducing itinerary exposure probability and its overhead. We summarize our work and outline future plans in section 4.
Itinerary Privacy Threat
Since nodes in the network are unlikely to move totally randomly but instead follow a certain schedule [8] , we design a mobility model, called rendezvous visiting or RV in short, to model the mobility scenario when the nodes move according to their itineraries. The RV mobility model can be viewed as a simplified agenda mobility model in [14] . In the RV model, a node visits the rendezvous in the network based on its itinerary and the path from one rendezvous to another rendezvous is defined as an itinerary segment. The itinerary of a node consists of itinerary segments. An itinerary segment comprises a starting and an ending rendezvous. For instance, an itinerary segment of a patrol car starts from location A to location B, which should be prevented from unauthorized tracking.
In this section, we describe a new privacy attack that discovers the itineraries of the mobile hosts in the network by using two important techniques, i.e. signalprint and multiple target tracking (MTT) [9] . The network scenario considered in the paper is a wireless mobile ad-hoc network and we assume wireless communications are symmetric (i.e. if node A can hear node B, then B can hear A).
The signalprint of a wireless transmission is a vector of signal strength measurements [2] . Signalprint has the following properties [2] . First, it is hard to spoof because radio transmitters have no control over signal attenuations within the network [2] . Second, signalprints are strongly correlated with the location of the radio transmitter and a stationary transmitter generates similar signalprints with high probability [2] . In [2] , D.B.Faria et al. propose a radio identification technique that robustly identifies a radio-transmitting device by its signalprints.
The Multi Target Tracking (MTT) algorithm is a well-studied technique to link location samples of the nodes to individual nodes based on the temporal and spatial correlation between successive location samples [4] . The multiple target tracking algorithm proposed in [9] generates a set of hypotheses about the possible motion traces of the nodes. The hypothetical motion traces are confirmed or eliminated when more location samples are processed. The algorithm stops when all location samples have been processed. For the details of the multiple target tracking algorithm, interested readers are referred to [9] .
In our system, we assume that the adversary deploys a sufficient number of snoopers in the network to cover the entire network, which passively eavesdrop on the radio transmissions in the network and send the collected signalprints to the adversary. Meanwhile, the adversary uses a localization technique similar to the one proposed by Tao et al. in [11] to determine the location of the radio transmitter with a precision of 2 meters. The localization system in [11] uses the Markov localization algorithm [3] to determine the location of the radio transmitter based on the signal strength information.
We assume that the adversary divides the network into a grid of equal-sized cells. From the experiment results of [2] , a node generates similar signalprints with high probability at locations less than 5 meters apart [2] . So we select 5 × 5 meters as the area of a grid cell such that a node will generate the same signalprint if it conducts multiple radio transmissions at the same cell. Once a radio transmission occurs in the network, the adversary locates the radio transmitter to a grid cell. We define some of the terms used in the paper as follows.
• itinerary segment: The itinerary of a node comprises a set of itinerary segments. When a node conducts an itinerary segment, it moves from one rendezvous to another rendezvous. An itinerary segment is represented as {start, end, time, speed}, in which start, end is the starting rendezvous and ending rendezvous, respectively. time specifies when the node starts the itinerary segment and speed specifies the moving speed of the node on the itinerary segment. Segments 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Fig. 1 are some example itinerary segments.
• transmission print: The adversaries store the information of each radio transmission as a transmission print, which includes the following information {signalprint, location, time}. location and time record where and when the radio transmission occurs, respectively.
• matchable transmission print: We call the transmissions prints generated by the same node at the same cell as matchable transmission prints.
We now describe how the adversary launches the itinerary privacy attack to discover the itineraries of the nodes in the network.
After a radio transmission is detected, the snoopers send the signal strength measurements of the radio transmission to the adversary. These signal strength measurements are used by the adversary to calculate the location and the signalprint of the radio transmission. Finally, the adversary stores the transmission print of the detected radio transmission in a database. For some non-anonymous routing schemes (e.g. DSR), the identity of the radio transmitter can be obtained from the message transmitted. Therefore, the adversary can easily draw the motion traces of the nodes based on the locations of the radio transmissions and the identities of the radio transmitters. So here we assume that the nodes can use an existing anonymous routing technique such as ANODR [7] to prevent the adversary from obtaining the identity of the radio transmitter from the content of the radio messages.
Since the adversary can not obtain the identity information directly from the messages detected, it uses the MTT technique to associate the transmission prints with individual radio transmitters. First the adversary uses the MTT algorithm to construct all the possible motion traces by exploiting the temporal and spatial correlations between subsequent transmission prints. Then the adversary uses signalprint information in the transmission prints to confirm or eliminate the hypothetical traces by finding the matchable transmission prints.
The signalprint technique makes it much easier for the adversary to confirm or eliminate the hypothetical motion traces during MTT computation process. Without matchable transmission prints, the MTT algorithm can only exploit the temporal and spatial correlations between radio transmissions to determine nodes' possible traces. Since a node will generate the same signalprints at the same cell, with signalprints the adversary can figure out which radio transmissions are from the same node to reduce the number of possible transmitters and hypothetical motion traces.
The transmission prints at a cell can be categorized into two types: matchable/non-matchable transmission prints. From the matchable transmission prints, the adversary learns when the node travels the cell and the interval between its tours. On the other hand, the number of non-matchable transmission prints reveals the number of transmitters touring the cell. With the above information, the adversary runs the MTT algorithm to eliminate or confirm the hypothetical motion traces. After the adversary is able to associate transmission prints with the motion traces, the itineraries of the nodes are exposed. For example, after a radio transmission of node x is detected by the adversary, the adversary can associate the transmission print of the radio transmission to a determined motion trace and predict the future motion of node x.
∆-mobility Camouflaging algorithm
We propose the ∆-mobility camouflaging algorithm to make it difficult for the adversary to determine the itineraries of the nodes. The ∆-mobility camouflaging algorithm is effective because of the following reasons.
1. With the ∆-mobility camouflaging algorithm, nodes take random camouflaging movements to cover their itinerary segments. Hence, the number of possible motion traces is significantly increased. Also the motion traces of the nodes are "mixed" and become less distinctive.
2. The probability of generating matchable transmission prints is reduced since nodes are unlikely to move in the same path. Hence, it becomes more difficult for the adversary to confirm or eliminate a hypothetical motion trace.
In this section, we first analyze the probability of exposing a node's itinerary when the node takes no camouflaging movements (i.e move straight from one rendezvous to another). Then we propose our ∆-mobility camouflaging algorithm and analyze its improvement on reducing the probability of exposing the itinerary.
Terminology and Notations
The terminologies and notations used in the paper are defined as follows.
• d i : the distance from the start to the end of an itinerary segment i.
• e 1 i : the mobility displacement of an itinerary segment i when using ∆-mobility.
• ξ i : the number of grid cells on an itinerary segment i when the node uses straight-line mobility.
• ξ ′ i : the number of grid cells on an itinerary segment i when the node uses ∆-mobility.
• ω i : the average number of radio transmissions conducted by a node on an itinerary segment i.
• µ i : the travel overhead of an itinerary segment i when using ∆-mobility.
• P τ : the probability of exposing an itinerary segment when using straight-line mobility.
• P ′ τ : the probability of exposing an itinerary segment when using ∆-mobility.
• α i : camouflaging angle of an itinerary segment i when using ∆-mobility.
• α max : the maximum camouflaging angle in ∆-mobility.
• S,D: source and destination.
Analysis of Non-camouflaging Mobility
The scenario when the nodes take no camouflaging movements (i.e straight-line mobility from the start to the end of the itinerary segment) is illustrated in Fig.  2 . Based on the collected transmission prints, the adversary calculates all the hypothetical motion traces of the nodes using the MTT algorithm. Then it confirms/eliminates the hypothetical motion traces using the information mined from transmission prints.
In our adversarial model, we assume that the adversary is able to associate two matchable transmission prints with the transmitter based on the temporal and spatial correlation of the transmission prints. Here we give a simple example to illustrate how the adversary exploits temporal and spatial information in the matchable transmission prints. For example, the adversary collected two matchable transmission prints: {signalprint 1 , location 1 , time 1 } and {signalprint 2 , location 2 , time 2 }. The adversary can calculate the traveling speed between these two matchable transmission prints as:
. If the traveling speed approximates the estimated speed of a node, then the adversary tentatively associates these two transmission prints with the node.
Since it requires only two different points on a line to determine the line, the adversary will be able to discover an itinerary segment of a node if the node leaves two matchable transmission prints on the itinerary segment. For the MTT details of constructing hypothetical motion traces, confirming and eliminating hypothetical motion traces, interested readers are referred to [9] . 
Figure 2. Straight-line Mobility
Let P 0 match be the probability of generating no matchable transmission print on an itinerary segment and P 1 match be the probability of generating only one matchable transmission print. We have:
Based on (1), equation (2) calculates P τ when ω i is smaller than ξ i . To generate a matchable transmission print, there must be at least two transmissions. Given ω i transmissions, P 
caculates P 1 match , in which (ξi−1) P (ωi−k) denotes the number of permutations of size ω i − k from a set of size ξ i − 1, and (
is the probability of k radio transmissions of a node occurring in one cell and the other ω i − k transmissions occurring in different cells. Fig. 3 shows that when ξ i = 400, it takes only 80 radio transmission for P τ to approach 1. And when ω i approaches ξ i , P τ becomes 1. From the above results, we know that a node exposes an itinerary segment quickly when there is no camouflaging mobility. Next we will analyze the itinerary exposure probability when using our ∆-mobility camouflaging algorithm. 
Analysis of ∆-mobility Camouflaging Algorithm
The ∆-mobility camouflaging algorithm makes it difficult for the adversary to distinguish the motion traces of the nodes by randomly distributing the transmission prints of the nodes and by avoiding generating matchable transmission prints.
∆-mobility camouflaging is shown in Fig. 4 . Each time a node tours an itinerary segment i, the node randomly selects a camouflaging angle α ≤ α max and a displacement e In Fig. 5 , a node x has an itinerary segment starting from A and going to B whereas a node y has an itinerary segment from C to D. Fig. 5 shows the transmission prints left by x and y when they take random triangle-shaped pathes generated by the ∆-mobility camouflaging algorithm and the straight-line paths. We can see that the transmission prints of ∆-mobility camouflaging are "mixed" together whereas the transmission prints of straight-line mobility show a distinctive pattern. Moreover, the transmission prints of the ∆-mobility camouflaging algorithm are distributed over a larger area while the transmission prints of straight-line mobility are focused on a narrow straightline area. Hence, the ∆-mobility camouflaging algorithm reduces the probability of generating matchable transmission prints. Next we analyze the overhead of ∆-mobility and the probability of exposing an itinerary segment.
Overhead Analysis of ∆-mobility
Compared with straight-line mobility, ∆-mobility incurs extra travel distance, which is called travel overhead. As illustrated in Fig.4 , we can compute the travel overhead µ i for an itinerary segment i with travel distance d i ( d i = |start i − right i |) as follows:
From equation (3), we know that overhead µ i is determined by the largest possible α i (i.e α max ) and
di . Fig. 6 shows that when α i ≤ 15
• and
di ≤ 0.4, the travel overhead is always smaller than 0.03. Plus, it is easy to control the overhead µ i by tuning α max and
di is known and we want the travel overhead to be no larger than µ i , we can set α max as 
Privacy Analysis of ∆-mobility
Now we calculate the itinerary exposure probability. In our evaluation of itinerary privacy, we assume a sufficient number of snoopers are distributed to cover the whole network. Each grid cell has a dimension of 5 × 5 meters.
As illustrated in Fig. 4 , for an itinerary segment i, ∆-mobility has a smaller probability of generating matchable transmission prints than straight-line mobility because its transmission prints are distributed to large triangle shapes with area e and ξ i are the number of cells that a node possibly visits when touring itinerary segment i using ∆-mobility and straight-line mobility, respectively. Notice that when using ∆-mobility, it is easy to choose e 1 i and α max to ensure
The calculation of P ′ τ is similar to the calculation of P τ , the result of which is shown in equation (6) . 
Using equation (7) and equation (2), we compare the itinerary exposure probability of straight-line mobility and ∆-mobility. We set Fig. 7 . Our results indicate that as ω i increases both P τ and P ′ τ increase while P ′ τ is significantly smaller than P τ . For example, when ω i = 32, P τ is 0.99 whereas P ′ τ is only 0.014. Also a larger α max will achieve a smaller P ′ τ . From Figs. 7 and 6, we can see that in general cases ∆-mobility reduces by more than 80% the itinerary exposure probability with a travel overhead less than 0.03. 
Conclusion
This paper has described the itinerary privacy attack and a model to measure itinerary privacy. To protect itinerary privacy, we designed a ∆-mobility camouflaging algorithm. Through mathematical analysis, we have showed that in general cases ∆-mobility decreases by more than 80% the itinerary exposure probability with less than 3% extra travel distance.
In our future work, we will extend the ∆-mobility camouflaging algorithm to other network scenarios such as delay-tolerant networks. Based on motions generated by the ∆-mobility camouflaging algorithm, we plan to construct a routing scheme that provides a comprehensive privacy protection.
